



New Security Challenges and Changes in Battle Space

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Abstract

This paper gives details of the nature, character and manifestations of emerging security threats in contemporary Nigerian State. The internal security threats confronting the Nigerian State are largely as a result of the failure of the State to perform its fundamental and legitimate role to the citizens. Hence, development with concentrations of growth, progress and provision of privileges to small geographical, political and social enclaves may also contribute to creating security threats from the deprived segment of the population not benefitting but excluded from the system and its privileges. The paper reveals the lessons of previous wars and the decisive effect of technology on the modern battlefields which have made force modernization a necessity in many armies. Armies in the past were trained towards fighting conventional warfare to conform to international norms and conventions. However, with the emergence of insurgency and technological advancements, threats to national security became multi-dimensional requiring new approaches to warfare. The paper recommends among others the need to understand battle space and its imperatives, counter terrorism and counter insurgency, more in-depth situational awareness of the battle space especially with the current advancement in information, communication and the advent of cyber space as another dimension exploited for warfare. Also, considering the diverse security challenges of our times, stronger civil-military relations would not only be mutually beneficial, but would also add to the regional and global security.

Keywords: *Security, Battle Space, Asymmetric Warfare, Technology, Westphalia.*

Introduction

The art of waging war has existed since the early man. Early battles involved the use of bare hands, and later sticks and stones. With time, this primitive method of battle developed into warfare between armies of organized groups, nation states and coalitions. The first generation wars between nations were driven by ideas and aristocratic culture (Afolayan, 2005). This period was marked by large infantry battles with massed firepower as depicted in the Battle of Waterloo and the Crimean War where linear tactics of column and line were employed (Afolayan, 2005). The second generation wars employed the tactics of attrition warfare. This period, which culminated in the First World War, marked the introduction of machine guns, indirect artillery and strong defensive positions (Onugha, 2005).

By the Second World War, advances in technology had introduced ships, tanks, aircraft and missiles among others. Third generation wars were considered as Manoeuvre Warfare (Wuyeb, 2005). These covered the period following the Second World

War up to the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War era marked the end of bi-polar rivalry and the emergence of a welter of nationalist, ethnic, religious, tribal and criminal conflicts (Wuyeb, 2005). Similarly, heavily armed Russian forces were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan by tribal irregulars while the United States pulled out of Somalia because insurgents won the information war (Dilli, 2005). These conflicts involve state and non-state actors. This development was exemplified by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre buildings and the Department of Defence (Pentagon) building in the United States of America (USA). The September 11 attacks were attacks on a state by a non-state actor; an act of terror rather than a conventional use of force (Okoye, 2008). Therefore, globally, contemporary challenges in area of security have shifted the focus of Armed Forces from the traditional interstate fighting to asymmetric intrastate violence. Many countries all over the world are plagued with internal security challenges ranging

from minor demonstration to full blown civil wars.

It therefore seems that these increasing tendencies for non-state actors to exploit the weaknesses of conventional forces by adopting unconventional strategies will likely dictate the nature of future conflicts. Indeed, these acts of violence have been referred to as Fourth Generation War (4GW) or Asymmetric Warfare (AW). It would be right to conclude as Clausewitz noted, that “every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions”(Mckenzie, 2001). The nature of today’s warfare is clearly asymmetric and the preoccupation of many nations is how to fight such wars.

AW is the ability of an irregular force to use its strengths against a regular opponent’s weakness in order to gain an advantage (United States Army, 1992). AW though an old method of warfare, has drawn a lot of attention recently because of the widespread involvement of non-state actors.

The concept of asymmetric warfare entails the adversary using many methods including terrorism, insurgency, war of information and ideas. Others are war of disruptive threats, attacks using biological weapons through the mail. In addition cyber attacks on the Internet and war waged by non state actors against the sole remaining superpower in other to achieve his selfish interest. The face and method not used by the current adversary is what is known as traditional warfare, this is conducted by the legitimate military forces of nation or states, wherein the objective is either terrain or enemy focused. Asymmetric warfare is the fourth generation warfare or an irregular warfare.

Over the years, regular military forces have always sought to exploit the weaknesses of an adversary so as to inflict maximum damage on the enemy at minimum cost. Sun Tzu recognized this when he noted that, “one engages in battle with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox” Today, ‘asymmetry’ is widely considered as the norm in a number of conflicts (Durfheim, 1997). AW manifests in many forms ranging from terrorism to organized crime, religious indoctrination and psychological operations (Fair, 2011). Along with conventional military strategy, new strategies must be devised to adequately combat AW threats. Failure to address these threats will have profound implications on national security.

CONCEPT AND NATURE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

To enhance the understanding of this study, it is necessary to discuss the concepts, nature and characteristics of AW. Asymmetric warfare describes a

conflict that often involves strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare with weaker combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality. Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized. The kind of asymmetric strategy and tactics seen in the Vietnam War were termed guerilla warfare (NADRDA, 2012). For a clear understanding of the subject, there is the need to first understand the nature of AW. Therefore, the tactical basis and terrain shall be discussed.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Asymmetric Warfare brings together many previous and specific ideas of guerrilla warfare, espionage, atrocity, violent resistance, sabotage, non-violent resistance and terrorism(Dohr, 2010). It is a broad and inclusive term coined to recognize that opposing sides in a conflict may have great disparity in strengths and weaknesses such that one may resort to drastic tactics to achieve relative advantage.

Li-Wei believes that a conflict is termed asymmetric when the strategic objectives of opponents are asymmetric or when the means employed are dissimilar(Ruttig, 2013). He argues that asymmetric strategies are often the result of asymmetries in strategic objectives and that AW can also result from one side engaging the opponent in a form, and at an intensity, which the adversary is unable or unwilling to resist (Awoyemi, 2003). This view sees asymmetric warfare as an end and brings to the fore the unevenness of the strategic objectives but does not fully consider the methods and approaches employed. Many will consider a weak opponent employing asymmetric tactics against an overwhelming opponent as sound military tactics. Similarly, the Coalition exploitation of superior technology in the Gulf War of 1991 cannot be said to be inferior tactical or operational strength.

Therefore, AW entails more than just leveraging of inferior tactical or operational strength against the adversaries vulnerabilities. Every nation has its own set of AW challenges(Babrik, 2008). Hence, AW should be viewed from a broader perspective. In AW there are no boundaries and they come in a number of unknown forms. They could be internally or externally generated and threaten the fabric upon which societies are built. AW includes terrorism in all its ramifications, violent civil unrest and the activities of organised crime gangs. The activities of warlords and rebels that threaten legitimate authority are also forms of AW.

NIGERIA'S SECURITY THREATS

A. TERRORISM

The United Nation member states have no common agreement on the definition of terrorism. As one state's 'terrorist' is another state's 'freedom fighter' (Fisher, 2015). Notwithstanding, the League of Nations Convention (1937) attempted an international definition when it suggested that "terrorism is all criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public".

Terrorism has occurred in almost all parts of the world, most notably in the United States of America, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia and Nigeria among others. Between 2009 and 2015, Boko Haram took control of extensive territories in Nigeria's North-East Region. Boko Haram has a decentralised structure comprising a number of cells. It is reported that there is little overt difference in the structural make up of ISWAP and JAS, the two Boko Haram factions, with some differences noted such as the roles and responsibilities of the Amir (International Crisis Group, 2020).

B. ORGANIZED CRIME

The police and justice system are set up to combat crime. However, some crimes have become big businesses run by large, mostly international syndicates that are organised along military lines with close ties to terrorists. Terrorists are involved in resource exploitation, gunrunning, drugs smuggling, arms proliferation, human trafficking and others (Gamble, 2010). These criminal gangs include drug gangs such as those in Columbia namely neo paramilitary criminal gangs and black eagles.

These gangs provide easy access to small arms and light weapons for proponents of AW. They will not hesitate to kill and cause widespread destruction if this is required for their survival. They do not just harm their victims but cause grave damage to the economies of countries in which they operate. They employ AW tactics of hit-and-run while avoiding confrontation with regular forces.

C. FARMERS-HEADERS CONFLICT

Farmers-Headers have lived harmoniously for centuries. However, the relationships between Fulani herders and settled farmer communities

have drastically deteriorated. Raids began escalating in 1999, becoming increasingly deadly since 2017. Between 2015 and 2018, it has been estimated that at least 3 641 people have been killed and an estimated 300 000 have been displaced as a result of the conflicts (Amnesty News, 2018). Drivers of the conflict include resource competition, the weak state (including anti-grazing laws and land grabs), ethnic and religious prejudice and the breakdown of pastoralist oversight arrangements. Additionally, the weakening of rural governance and regulatory systems has led many young Fulani men into criminality, banditry, and kidnapping.

D. BANDITRY AND KIDNAPPING

According to the West Africa Network of Peace building (WANEP), armed bandits accounted for more than 1 000 civilian deaths between January and December 2019 in north-western Nigeria alone, which, according to the CFR's Nigeria Security Tracker, is 'greater than civilians killed by Boko Haram over the same period. According to figures by the Council on Foreign Relations, 'more than 1 100 people were killed in 2018' in Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kaduna, Niger and Kebbi due to banditry, 'over 2 200 were killed in 2019, and more than 1 600 fatalities were recorded between January – June 2020. Whilst kidnap attempts used to mainly target rich and important political figures and their families or relatives, more recent data suggests that less targeted kidnappings are taking place focusing instead on whole villages or pupils from schools, who may not be able to pay the demanded ransom, explaining the rise in fatalities from kidnapping attempts. Armed forces responded with increased airstrikes and ground operations. Community vigilante, civilian self-defense militias, and youth groups have also started reprisal attacks against armed group (International Crisis Group, 2020).

E. BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE

There has been an emergence of non-state actors in the Post Cold War era adopting asymmetric warfare tactics in several conflicts against state actors. This has made the control of CNBWs an issue of global international importance. This weapon in the hands of non-state actors such as ISIS, Alshabab, Alqaeda, Touareg rebels and BokoHarram

Terrorist (BHT) in northeastern Nigeria will constitute a great threat to conventional forces and civilians vulnerable to attacks by such groups. Chemical and biological agents can be spread through the air, water and food supplies. This was evident by the 2001 anthrax attacks in 2007 killed 5 people, 4 of whom were not the intended targets. After considering Al Qaeda, draining ponds in search of evidence and pursuing the wrong person, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) traced the letters to a domestic scientist working in bio-defence. He was one of the FBI's own advisors on anthrax. Other means of weapon delivery in BCW include the use of mails. This method can deliver a WMD to attack a country.

Chemical weapons have the same potential for killing thousands of people in a city attack. Under the Chemical Weapons Conventions, states representing 98 percent of the world's population and the same percentage of the chemical industry got rid of chemical weapons in 2012. However, States like North Korea refused. On December 2008, more than 40 percent of the worlds declared its chemical stockpile, led by the stockpilers Russia and the USA. This chemical stockpile had been destroyed. Consequently, this has reduced the access to BCW in the world more especially, to any terrorist groups.

F. ACTIVITIES OF REBEL MOVEMENTS

Internal threats are contradictions emanating from within the state, to the extent that they endanger its very existence. Awoyemi (2003) posits that internal threats to national security are not mere political or economic irritations, but challenges to the territorial and corporate integrity of the country.

Africa is rife with internal conflicts and threats to state authority. This is demonstrated by events in Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Somalia and Sudan among others (Jibrin, 2006). Some of these conflicts are conducted by rebel movements. These rebel movements seek to overthrow legitimate state authorities. Notable rebel movements include the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone among others. These radical elements use violent means against legitimate authority to achieve their aims. They employ mostly AW techniques. They in most cases avoid sustained contact with government

military forces, employing hit-and-run tactics as well as attacks on civilians. These rebels and other proponents of AW employ various types of weapons to achieve their objectives. The South-East Region has a history of fragile security and separatist groups aiming for secession, notably the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). These groups largely advocated for peaceful change. In September 2017, the federal government declared IPOB a terrorist organization. There are reports of killings, discrimination, arbitrary arrest and harassment of both groups at the hands of state authorities. Pro Biafra members and protestors have been arrested in recent years. Since August 2020, violence between IPOB and the state police and army has escalated (International Crisis Group, 2020).

WEAPONS EMPLOYED IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Weapons used in the propagation of AW can be grouped into nuclear, chemical, biological, information, and conventional weapons (Buffaloed, 2006). Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are usually classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Freeman posits that the employment of WMD is the most feared because of the widespread destruction they can inflict (Department of Defense, 2010). Notwithstanding, he argued that based on historical antecedents, WMD do not appear to be the weapons of choice for proponents of AW. Jenkins agrees that the aim is in getting ‘a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead’. A contrary opinion is that WMD is not the weapon of choice because terrorists have not been able to lay their hands on them. Notwithstanding, the fear of the possible use of WMD by terrorists is real. Information operation as a weapon of AW encompasses cyber-terrorism, cyber-warfare, or any generalised attacks on a nation’s electronic infrastructure. To Grange, info-sphere has become a new battleground for AW (David, 2000). AW actors manipulate the print and electronic media on a global scale to their advantage. This is done through deception and disinformation. Another medium is through disruption on the Internet. For example, the planting of a computer virus (such as the ILOVEU virus which plagued computers worldwide in May 2000) could be virtually imperceptible until the damage is done. Information as a weapon of AW does not follow any rules and is perhaps the most potent of the weapons of AW.

Conventional weapons in AW relate to bombs, rockets, missiles, explosives, guns, and small arms. In Africa, the majority of weapons used had been Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and homemade bombs (David, 2000). The common characteristic of weapons of AW is that they create terror and most are capable of causing large-scale destruction to lives and property.

AW weapons can be delivered in a number of ways. They can be delivered by individuals and small combat groups. Other methods are through letters, parcels, containers and car bombs. They can also be by model aircraft, civilian aircraft and missiles. Due to the wide range of weapons and numerous delivery options available to AW actors, the form, place and timing of AW will prove difficult to predict. Therefore, the required response to AW threats must be equally innovative and flexible. The first line of defence against AW is prevention, management and resolution by non-military means. However, where this fails there will be the need to resort to the instrument of force to prevent AW actors from imposing their will. The armed forces of a nation are the legal instrument of force available to prevent AW.

TACTICAL BASIS

The tactical success of AW is dependent on the assumption that one side could have a technological advantage which outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy (Army Field Manual, 1998). If the inferior power is in a defensive position, for instance, under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics. Such tactics include the selection of battles in which the superior power is weaker. These are effective means of harassment without violating the laws of war. The classical examples of this doctrine may be found in the American Revolutionary War against democratic aggressive nations, thereby provoking protests and disputes among elected legislators.

If the inferior power is in an aggressive position, and turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war, its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like tactics. For example, the Laws of Armed Conflicts (LOAC) prohibits the use of a flag of truce or clearly marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush (David, 2000). An asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactics to its advantage depends on the superior power's obedience to the same law. As seen in most conflicts of the twentieth and twenty first centuries, this is highly unlikely as the propaganda advantage has always outweighed adherence to international law, especially by dominating sides of conflicts.

From the foregoing, it can be surmised that an asymmetric attacker as in the case of Boko Haram usually explores unconventional means to take advantage of the weaknesses of the potential adversary. This presupposes that superior powers need to take appropriate measures to guard against such inherent weaknesses from asymmetric combatant.

USE OF TERRAIN

A key feature of AW is the use of terrain. Terrain can be used as a force multiplier by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the larger force. Sun Tzu, in his book *The Art of War* stated that, “the contour of the land is an aid to the army sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distance. Those who do battle without knowing these will lose.” A good example of this type of strategy is the Battle of Marathon, where the narrow terrain of a defile was used to canalize the Persian forces, which were numerically superior, to a point where they could not use their size as an advantage.

The skillful use of terrain could be a battle winning factor. Terrain, if well utilized, could have a great impact on the outcome of military operations. For example, the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan were able to defeat the superior Soviet forces through the combined use of the terrain and resilience. It could thus be inferred that a small force could inflict serious casualty on a larger force by exploiting the advantages offered by terrain.

Conventional wars are multi-dimensional in nature and could be fought on land, sea, air and in the electromagnetic spectrum. Terrain in conventional environment provides manoeuvre concealment and deployment as effort are geared towards the capture and holding of ground. Terrain could be aggregated into tactical, operational and strategic grounds which are not same in an asymmetric environment where strategic features like cities, supply routes and important administrative centres are fought for and held by insurgents. Conventional warfare involve deep, close and rear operations including positional defence with terrain clearly defined.

One striking feature of sub-conventional warfare is the use of rural and urban terrain as the main theatre of fighting. Insurgents use this ability to blend with the local populace and use them as shield. Other characteristics of sub-conventional warfare include increase engagement in built up areas, absence of no man’s land and fragile holding of ground. In the same vein, the supports they

enjoy by means of coercion or sympathy among the people enable them to establish camps in secured forested or desert locations. These also enhanced their ability to surprise security forces and inflict or cause attrition as is being experience in military facilities around the country particularly in Nigeria.

Success of sub-conventional warfare could be largely attributed to support being enjoyed by the perpetrators from local sympathizers. Armies need to develop an effective civil military relation system that would check popular support and sympathy insurgents receive from the populace in conflict areas. This would be by embarking on quick impact projects such as improving water access, rehabilitation and construction of basic infrastructures such as town halls, roads, schools and health centers. These would enhance the ability of armies to receive intelligence on the insurgents from the population in order to apply fire power and other military means in operations.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONTAINMENT OF SECURITY THREATS

The strategies for containing security threats in contemporary Nigerian state is largely traceable to the situation in Europe before, during and immediately after the thirty-year war that ravaged Europe from 1618-1648. The Treaty of Westphalia that ended the war in 1648. Traditionally, the state, arising from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is the custodian and ultimate beneficiary of the legitimate monopoly use of force. During this period, threat to security largely involved state to state aggression. This formed the platform with which the strategic security thinking and structure was established and radically transformed and changed what is today known as nation-states in legal terms and conferred on states the legitimacy and monopoly of the use of force. Hence, for the first time in Europe, a central authority emerged with the power to monopolize the use of force within a certain territory in relation to both internal and external forces (Nnoli, 2006). Under the circumstance, national security was equated with power, and power is synonymous with military might. Ever since then and till today especially in Nigeria, the strategies for curtailing security threats has remained closely associated with military might. A general look at the post-independence Nigeria has shown that since independence in 1960 most of the security challenges confronting the Nigerian state are internally induced and generated and has largely attracted military response for containment. According to Nnoli (2006), the Westphalian system evolved and formed the platform upon which nation-states formed their strategies for

containing both national and international security threats. Nwolise (2019) asserts that Contemporary Nigerian state has inherited strong elements of this version of the Westphalian system, particularly the importance of power, defined in terms of military capacity and capability. This manifests in the creation and projection of military power which exerts great influence in security thinking and architecture to the extent that the containment of security threats in the

Nigerian state today hinges on power and the military apparatus which in most cases serve as instrument for state repression. In practice, the perception of the political leaders about national security is still traditional-that is- state-centric. That is why they are fixated on the use of force (military strategy) to resolve issues even when clear-cut injustices are on ground that could be resolved through early honest dialogue, negotiations and other non-kinetic measures.

There are different perspectives on security threat containment. However, this study will emphasize on the society-security perspective which focus on society as the most important referent object for security studies because humans do not always view groups identities and collectivities in purely instrumental terms. Rather, as Shaw (1994) cited in Williams (2008) put it, to be fully human is to be part of specific social groups. Therefore, if we must address what constitute internal security threats in Nigeria, the different levels of analysis-state, individual and society or environment both internal and external to it as postulated in the Multi-Track Security Management theory adopted must be considered.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MORDERN BATTLEFIELD

Battle field as one of the key components of warfare has some enduring characteristics. These characteristics include technology and science, multidimensional battle and battlefield. Other characteristics are allies and media.

Technology and Science. The advancement in technology has made war fare more sophisticated. Commanders must therefore have a thorough understanding of the characteristics of equipment and associated technologies that exist in their command and those of the enemy.

The Media. In modern concept of operations, the media is embedded as part of the operation. A commander must understand the capabilities and needs of the media and the implications of their activities. The commander should

endeavour to establish a sound working relationship with the media for sound and accurate reporting on the operation.

The Battlefield. Battlefield is another vital characteristic of modern warfare. The quantity and quality of information and intelligence which is available to the commander gives modern warfare a new character. This is also aided by the speed of ground and air vehicles. The pace of battle is also increased by the interaction between the volume of available information and events. Furthermore, improvements in weapon capabilities and target acquisition also allow the battle to be fought at longer range and with greater precision.

Allies. In modern times battles are not fought in isolation. In almost every circumstance battles are fought as coalition. The on-going MNJTF operation in the North East is a perfect example. Although there can be no guaranteed unity of command, commanders must make efforts to make alliance work in the interest of the operation.

Multi-Dimensional Battle. Multi-dimensional concept of battle entails that battles are fought in the frame work of deep, close and rear operations. Battles are therefore fought simultaneously at all levels of intensity and in all dimensions.

Thus it can be seen that the nature of warfare in First World War (WW1) was war of attrition. Warfare during this period entails total annihilation of the enemy forces. Warfare during this period entails total annihilation of the enemy forces. This was seen to be a departure from the way war was fought earlier. The nature of warfare in WW1 dramatically changed from previous wars. Armies were no longer about prestige and honour with only thousands of soldiers going to war. WW1 changed the nature of warfare with one of the highest rates of human casualties estimated at over 35 million people. Prior to that time war was won relatively quickly and enemies surrendered when their loss was high.

Australian Defence glossary defined attrition as an approach to warfare characterised by the application of substantial combat power that reduces the adversary's ability to fight through loss of personnel and materiel. In the battle of Verdun, the French and Germans attacked each other but the Germans had massive artillery causing attrition which made attacks pointless for the French. It took the intervention of the British Forces to save the French Forces from total annihilation (Army Field Manual, 1998). Attrition with large number of

military personnel compared to previous wars made WW1 deadly. The nature of warfare today differs from that of WW1. Today armies deploy a lot less personnel and the death rate is much lower. Technology has advanced at a very fast pace and has impacted on the fields of weapons and communications. Today, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks the US and its allies have commenced a war on terrorism in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The changing nature of warfare has made many armies around the world to embrace unconventional methods of fighting, otherwise known as asymmetric warfare.

PREDISPOSING FACTORS OF SECURITY THREATS

i. **Lopsided Development, Marginalization and Inequalities in the Country**

The present government of Nigeria has severally been accused of ethnic bias and the marginalization of some sections of the country in the distribution of basic infrastructure and these have greatly compounded the security of Nigeria (Nwadiakor, 2011). Key political appointments presently have been given to people of Northern extraction while the South-East has been left in the cold. This perhaps explains the agitation for the Republic of Biafra and several security breaches that have accompanied the agitation. Besides, it is quite glaring that there is great disparity in life chances in Nigeria.

ii. **Unemployment Rate**

According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2019, cited in International Crisis Group, (2020), Nigeria's unemployment rate is at 23.1%, of which youth unemployment is 55.4%. This figure has continued to increase yearly as Nigerian institutions keep graduating batches of youths with the prior impression of getting a better job and opportunities after graduating. Suleiman (2018), opined that anxiety from Nigerian graduates that later turn to frustration, and then to aggression on the government is what has fueled the emergence of most of these security threats in the country

iii. **Ethno-Religious Conflicts**

Suspicion and mutual distrust among the various ethnic groups as well as the major religions in Nigeria have tended to be a source of security challenges. Two dominant religions exist in Nigeria- Islam and Christianity and there has been frequent and persistent religious

clashes between these dominant religions and the end seems not to be in sight. In all parts of the country, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming rates, making a mockery of the security order.

CONCLUSION

The lessons of previous wars and the decisive effect of technology on the modern battlefields have made force modernization a necessity in many armies. Armies in the past were trained towards fighting conventional warfare to conform to international norms and conventions. However, with the emergence of insurgency and technological advancements, threats to national security became multi-dimensional.

Wars have continued to evolve, and so also is the means of prosecution as well as the battle space where they are fought. Accordingly, militaries all over the world have often always sought means to keep up to the pace of the evolution of war in order to effectively address any security threats posed by an adversary. While wars in the past have been largely fought by conventional means involving regular and distinguishable forces from nation states, modern day warfare has since deviated from this norm. Today, asymmetric warfare has become the new face of war fighting with the belligerents, usually non-state actors, either state sponsored proxies or self-serving groups, employing guerrilla tactics against nations or other rival groups. These new forces often challenge a political status quo either to subvert or overthrow it through the use of terrorism. The development of this new concept of warfare fighting also gave rise to the military term counter terrorism and counter insurgency (CTCOIN) as an approach to addressing its threat. Similarly, just as the conventional warfare required a detailed understanding of the battle space and its imperatives, counter terrorism and counter insurgency requires same if not a more in-depth situational awareness of the battle space especially with the current advancement in information, communication and the advent of cyber space as another dimension exploited for warfare.

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