An Analysis of Insecurity Challenges in Northern Nigeria: A Case of Banditry and Insurgency

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Abstract

Insurmountable challenge to internal security is evident in Nigeria given the formation, proliferation armed non-state actors across the different parts of the country occasioned by deterioration of social conditions, conflicts, insecurity, political assassinations and unemployment among other challenges. Being theoretical, the study adopt the use of secondary data sourced to frame and analyze causes, pattern and response to insecurity challenges in the northern Nigeria. The remote and immediate causes of deterioration of the security include among others, absence of institutional capacity resulting in government failure; wide social inequality, absence of fairness and justice; ethno-religious conflicts; and disconnect between the people and the government. These and many other factors like, porous borders, rural-urban drift, poverty and unemployment have combined to further aggravate the problem of insecurity in the north. Although insurgency is identified as the most daunting security challenge facing the region, threats of farmers-herders conflict, armed robbery and communal clashes are threatening the peace, the region is known for decades. The general dissatisfaction with the various government including performance of electoral officials at all levels, lack of transparency and accountability, endemic corruption created opportunities that were exploited by insurgents to recruit poverty ravaged vulnerable persons to join their cause. Thus, explain the nexus between governance and security. As an impeccable means of ending violence, authorities are required to step up holistic measures and demonstrate
commitments towards protecting lives of all groups and communities, as well as their assets and property.

**Keywords:** Farmers-herders conflict, Boko Haram insurgency, communal clashes, North.

**Introduction**

Deterioration of internal security has characterized Nigeria since the return to democratic rule in 1999. While democracy is often associated with good governance, the situation in Nigeria seems very contrasting. Nigeria’s democratic experiment is characterized by conflicts, insecurity, political assassinations and unemployment among other challenges. Insurmountable challenge to security is evident given the formation, proliferation and challenges pose by non-state actors across the different parts of the country notably, Bakassi Boys in the south-east, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in south-south and Boko Haram in the north-east. Other forms of armed groups in the north include ECOMOG, Sara Suka and Yankalare (CLEEN Foundation, 2016).

The northeast region has in the last two decades been ravaged by spates of violence and insecurity. “The region is currently going through a complex mix of security challenges, including armed banditry in the international border areas, different shades of ethnic and religious violence and ferocious insurgency of Boko Haram ravaging almost all the six states within the region” (CLEEN Foundation, 2016, p 3). With the level of violence and closeness to international borders, the northeast has deteriorating cases of small arms and light weapons proliferation, as well as huge presence of military assault weapons in the hands of the militant groups. The zone has in the last decade produced extreme militant groups, the Boko Haram.

On the parallel, Northwest is suffering deadly conflict involving many armed groups, including farmer-herder-allied groups, vigilantes, criminal gangs and jihadists. Violence is rooted in competition over resources between predominantly Fulani herders and mostly Hausa farmers. It has escalated amid thrive of organized crime including cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom and village raids. Jihadist groups are now stepping in to take advantage of the security crisis. The violence has killed over 8,000 people since 2011, and displaced over 200,000, some into neighboring Niger. Despite several security operations and dialogue efforts, a long-lasting peace remains
elusive. The paper is therefore aimed at analyzing the causes and pattern of the insecurity challenges in the northeast and northwest including past and extant strategies of curbing the menace. The objective is to gain understanding of the security challenges, forestalling any further deterioration and exploring means of resolution on a platter of sustained win-win solution.

Methodology
The study being theoretical, adopt the use of secondary data sourced from academic literature, organization reports, gazette and dailies to frame and analyze causes, pattern and response to insecurity challenges in the northern Nigeria. As against the individual state focus, which allowed for analysis of separate states, the research focused on the two major blocks of the north: Northeast and North West. The focus is in view of the commonalities of causes, pattern and response to insecurity challenges within each of the block and a sharp contrast between the two and hence, the research collapse the insignificant variation in state-based and isolated individual cases analysis. Exploring the lens of existing theoretical frameworks in social science and humanities, references drawn from similar scenario in other context, juxtaposing what is obtained in the region could avail insight to infer. In this way, an attempt is made to identify and analyze the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and intrigue violence hitting the northeast and northwest respectively. The study is not oblivious of the divergent perspectives in the extant literature on the topic including views and opinions expressed by the broad spectrum of writers/authors and hence, the methodology takes into cognizance the sensitivity of the area.

Theoretical Voyage
Two broad spectrums of paradigm exist on the roots of insurgency in the northern Nigeria. A paradigm that view the insurgence as an outcome of internal factors also known as the internal factors paradigm and external forces paradigm. The internal factors paradigm emphasized on socio-economic factors, as well as deep-seated political and religious differences in the Nigerian society.

From internal factor paradigm, the relational also known as vengeance theory explored sociological, political, economic, (religious) and historical relationships between groups. The theory postulates that cultural and value differences as well as group interests influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, ethnic and
racial intolerance and discrimination, (Faleti, 2006). The differences in societal value eventually creates the “We” and ‘Others” dichotomy. For example, Boko Haram group is bond either by one or combination of fighting the “unbelievers”, feeling of deprivation, vengeance for the murder of their leader perceived the remaining members of the society as the “Others”. More so, several attacks and reprisal attacks between communities along ethnic and religious lines could be explained under the thrust of the “We” and “Others” psychology (Alozieuwa, 2012).

The human needs perspective shifts the argument of insecurity away from religious, regional or ethnic inclinations and connect it to socioeconomic conditions; exploring human needs as the central focus. The central assumption here is that humans are on the journey to fulfil their basic needs and obstacles caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict. The theory is closely similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence, which postulates that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dougherty & Pfaltzgrate Jr, 1990). The socio-economic factors include unemployment, poverty and deteriorating standard of living are adduced as the root causes of violence in the north. To this end, consecutive low ranking status of Nigeria in all development indices validate the assumption of the theory. For instance, Human Development Index Trend ranked Nigeria 156/186 in 2011; 157/189 in 2017; 158/189 in 2018; out of which a study has shown that the northern region is acutely ravaged by development crisis having an average poverty incidence of 70.1% compared to 34.9% of the south (Alozieuwa, 2012).

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that the violence is the fallout of a fierce political battle. Emergence of religious extremist group in a multi-religious political setting in which religion is a major factor in determining the distribution of political power (Kukah, 1993) can hardly be divorced from political undertone. For instance, “the emergence of Boko Haram in 2011 is preceded by intense political bickering between some, mainly Muslim political actors in the north and their counterparts in the south in the period leading to the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and southerner” (Alozieuwa, 2012, p 3).

Given that Jonathan’s electoral victory in 2010 came barely three years after power returned to the north, from an eight-year halt in the south, aborting the power-sharing arrangement between the north and south instituted by elites. Having lost out in the power stakes, political desperados resort to the manipulation of the ragtag, brained washed youth with the aim to bring the society to its knees, create
a situation of total anarchy that will either break up the nation or bring back the military (Newsweek, 2012) or make the country ungovernable. While internal forces conspiracy theory attempts to blame the rising security challenges in the north on the northern political power desperado who, having lost power, are bent on bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership, it was also conjured that the Jonathan administration itself might have sponsored the crisis in order to rally southern support behind his administration. Another trajectory attribute the insurgency in the north to a handy work of secret cult controlled by some ‘invisible’ hands that seek to destroy the north so as to forestall or weaken its political relevance (Adibe, 2012).

A deep seated ideological intrigue proclaimed that western education is incapable of stimulating meaningful development and prosperity and hence, western education is incompatible with Islam is an imbedded fallacy within the adherent to radical Islamist groups (Lengmang, 2011). The mission of the adherent of the ideology is to dislodge established government and administrative structure that is based on secular system – “kufur” and invariably enthronement of an Islamic theocratic state. However, permutation of factors such as Iranian Revolution of 1979; American presence in the Middle East, anti-western sentiment in the Middle East (Mozayyan, 2009); corruption, ineffective and failed operationalization of Western ideologies by local political leadership are likely reasons linked to the rise of the radical Islamist groups in the northern Nigeria.

Two major planks lies in the external forces paradigm: one characterizes the problem as part of global Islamic jihad with focus on linkages of the international terror groups such as al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM); the other plank views it from conspiracy perspective – either as a grand strategy by the powerful west to cause break up of Nigeria, (Africa in 2020 Panel Report) and or that Nigeria is being targeted by troubled neighboring African states who envy Nigeria’s progress and stability and hence, deployed insurgents as destabilization mechanism. Another view of the conspiracy theory contends that the insurgency was a strategy to portray Islam in bad light by hitting Christian targets. This view draws support from a number of arrest of Christians and southerners that masqueraded as Boko Haram to carried out attacks on churches and commit other heinous atrocities/crimes including advanced threats (Blueprint, 2012).

Causes of Insecurity in Northern Nigeria

Years of fragile and shaky nature Nigeria’s institutional framework have provoked deterioration in governance and democratic accountability, paralyzing the existing formal and legitimate rules vested in the hierarchy of social order (Achumba,
Ighomereho, & Akporobaro, 2013). Ultimately, the insecurity in Nigeria is but a function of government failure (Igbuzor, 2011). Government failure manifests in the incapacity of government to deliver public goods to its citizens. Thus lack of basic necessities has created a growing army of frustrated citizens who resort to violence with little or no provocation or opportunity. Consequent of government failure over the years led to growing disconnect between people and their government. Successive administrations neither civilian nor military have not been able to bridge the ethnic or religious discord, distrust and resentment nor foster patriotism or national cohesion. Given the fact that people have a perception that government does not care about their welfare, they become easy prey to anti-government resentment. This is in addition to wide social division that subject vast majority into wallowing in abject poverty while few political opportunists live in affluence. Even security has almost become the exclusive preserve of those who can afford it. Thus Nigerian security challenges is precipitated by the failure to recognize nexus between national security and development at one hand and basic social and economic conditions on the other. Thus long years of deprivation and state of inequality, unfairness and injustice has forced citizens to resort to self-help in exploring alternative socioeconomic and political order. Ethno-religious conflicts break out when the relations between members of different ethnic or religious groups is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency to use violence to settle grievances. In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society such as Nigeria, these conflicts have revolved around a myriad of concerns. For example, the distribution of scarce resources, public offices, power, land, chieftaincy titles, the creation, demarcation and control of local government councils, control of markets and religious activities. Many of these ethno-religious conflicts have resulted in violence and large scale killings (Adagba, Ugwu, & Eme, 2012). The collapse of moral values within Nigeria is another factor behind the continued security challenges. The modern age may have brought greater individual freedoms, but it has also seen a disintegration of traditional communal values. New set of values based on selfish, chauvinistic, corrupt and ‘might-is-right’ principle are formed. These and many proximate factors such as porous borders, rural-urban drift, poverty and unemployment, have combined to aggravate the problem of insecurity in Nigeria.
Evolution of Boko Haram Crisis in the Northeast

In 2019, Brechenmacher provided an overview on the evolution of Boko Haram group that first emerged as an Islamic reform movement in the northeastern town of Maiduguri in the early 2000s. At emergence, the group was led by Muhammad Yusuf who condemned Western-style education and corrupt secular governance. In 2009, clashes between Boko Haram members and police forces escalated into several days of armed uprising in Maiduguri. The Nigerian government brutally crushed the insurrection, leaving several hundreds dead—including Yusuf himself. Following government’s crackdown on the members of Boko Haram and execution of their leader, the movement re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, carrying out sporadic attacks across the northeast (ICG, 2014). The group continued clandestine tactics that gradually grew more sophisticated. In June 2013, Boko Haram was designated as a terrorist organization with ties to international jihadist networks by the then president Goodluck Jonathan administration (CNN, 2019), the decision had little effect of counterterrorism response nationally and internationally even with both the UK and the U.S conforming to the new status of the group. In addition, the step weakened the possibility of a political solution to the escalating conflict (Vanguard, 2013).

In 2013, military intensified campaign against Boko Haram and its indiscriminate tactics failed to degrade the group’s capacity. A state of emergency imposed on Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States only deepened the cycle of violence. In April 2014, Boko Haram’s kidnapping of 276 female students from the town of Chibok made worldwide headlines, drawing greater policy attention to the crisis. However, Boko Haram expanded its control of the northeastern countryside increased concerned about Boko Haram’s threat to regional stability.

In early 2015, in the midst of Nigeria’s election season, a renewed military offensive began making headway against the group. After repeated delays, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF)—a coalition of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—seized back most of the territory previously held by Boko Haram. The involvement of neighboring countries sparked an increasing regionalization of the crisis and further militarization of the conflict response. However, violence and insecurity persist in the northeast despite the recapture, from the militant group Boko Haram, dozens of towns and the rescue of over 1,000 hostages by Nigerian and neighboring countries’ forces.

Over the past three years, military assault against Boko Haram resulted into drastic decline in the activities of the groups including the number of mortality associated with their attacks. As the insurgents were pushed back into more remote rural areas,
they resorted into attacking soft target in guerilla-style warfare. However, while Nigerian security forces have fortified urban centers from sporadic attacks, they are struggling to consolidate control over rural and vulnerable areas.

**Nature of Violent Conflicts in the North West and Non-State Actors Involved**

ICG (2020) acknowledged that the violence hitting northwest is multi-faceted nonetheless that can be broadly divided into three major categories. Firstly, violence pitting mainly ethnic Hausa sedentary farmers and vigilantes acting on their behalf against predominantly Fulani nomads and associated militias. Local commanders without specifically identified line of control lead the Fulani militias that operate in a largely decentralized manner. Nonetheless the militias are fighting on behalf of herders in their disputes with farmers, rouge elements among them often engage in some sorts of criminal activities. Secondly, violence committed by criminal gangs involved in large-scale cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, pillage, and attacks on gold miners and traders. These groups comprise a mix of individuals from Fulani, Hausa and other ethnic origins, and seek to enrich themselves rather than to advance a political or ideological course. These groups do not operate like militias; they are neither cohesive nor under a centralised command. They also act autonomously, sometimes in rivalry with one another. Thirdly, violence involves confrontations between government security forces and jihadist groups that are increasingly active in the region.

**Implications of the Insecurity in the Northern Nigeria**

There are several implications of the ongoing insecurity in the north. One major implication is pervasive killings wanton destruction of lives and property worth billions thereby causing great deal of downsize of human capital and resources of the region in particular and the country at large. The insurgence displaced hundreds of thousand Nigerians mainly women and children, creating a dire humanitarian crisis. Recently in Rann, Borno State approximately 35,000 were forced into neighbouring Cameroon. It was estimated that between December 2018 and January 2019, the number of IDPs in four of the Maiduguri camps (Gubio Road, Teachers Village, Bakasi) grew from about 79,000 to approximately 113,000 individuals (UNHCR, 2019).

Activities of insurgents and various other militia groups has implicated into low participation of local and foreign investors in the economic development resulting into low income for government from oil revenue and other sector of the economy. Resources generated from various sources, which are supposed to be channeled to
human capital and infrastructural development are deployed to prosecute war against insurgents and other security challenges, rehabilitation and reconstruction thereby exacerbating vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment. Huge amount of money exchange hands between families of victims and insurgent, militias and other criminal gangs in what seems to be kidnapping spree engulfing the region. The menace do not only deprived individuals and families’ peace and freedom of movement but caused colossal loss of personal income by means of ransoms. Loss of money to army robbers, kidnappers etc has negative implication on the national development.

Farmers and people of other vocations in the northern region ravaged by various shades of insecurity are either killed or displaced into IDP camps or other communities forcing them to abandon cultivation and other economic activities thereby creating food scarcity and hardship. Budget allocation from the start of insurgency in 2009 increased geometrically. Nigeria has expended a total of $19,176bn between 2009 and 2018 on military, an amount that far outweighs the combined expenditure of Cameroon, Chad and Niger that stands at $8,526.5bn) on same. The increase in the defense budget is at the expense of critical social infrastructure and human capital development with grave negative effect on the economy.

Swollen up of defense budgetary allocation which often necessitate Nigeria government to resort to external borrowing in order to complement eventually open a gate for massive corruption. However, huge amount of such budget was alleged to have been embezzled by unscrupulous government officials, politicians and high ranking military officers. Readily more than US$2 billion popular ‘Dasukigate’ come to mind. Insecurity have forced the closing down of some indigenous and foreign companies while some foreign companies operating in Nigeria have moved either back to their counties or other neighboring West African countries. Remaining are operating at low capacity leading to retrenchment of employed youths the further compounded the problem of unemployment. Deterioration of education: with close down of schools and reduction in school enrollment and admissions in higher levels further deteriorate education of the region thereby reducing the production of human capital resource needed.

International embarrassment and ridicule: the insecurity eroded the prestigious status of Nigeria and her soldiers in the eyes of international community. Nigeria is known for her leadership, prowess and heroine performance at various UN and regional peace keeping role, but a twist by the insurgency exposure a serious crack in her governance and sharp corruption practices.
Challenges of Insecurity in the Northern Nigeria

Several challenges have beclouded the ongoing efforts to restore peace and security in the Northern Nigeria. Recurring attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP as well as ongoing military operations exacerbate humanitarian crisis, caused delay in the efforts to return displaced populations, and expose more communities to vulnerability of high risk thereby and triggered new population movements. As of October 2018, over 2 million individuals remain displaced, a number swelled up over the past years.

Despite geometric increased in budget allocation for defence, deficit in critical military hardware such as T-72 tanks, mortar tubes, night vision goggles, and Shilka guns, among others continue to characterize the fight against insurgency and other insecurity in the north. Inadequate weaponry, poor logistics and intelligence exposing the security personnel vulnerable of being overwhelmed by the insurgents who appeared better organized, motivated and logistically equipped.

For instance, It was reported that senior army officers have on several occasions deprived soldiers on front line ammunitions and logistics to properly prosecute the war, forcing them to flee when attacked (Transparency International, 2017). For instance, in November 2014, Boko Haram attacks Maiha, a town in northern Adamawa State, forced soldiers into fleeing, abandoning their weapons; (Onuoha, Nwangwu, & Ugwueze, 2020).

Security personnel on the battle field against insurgents are not motivated leading to low morale. In most cases, the weapons provided to the military on frontline fighting insurgents are either obsolete or lesser in sophistication when compare with that of the insurgents; their allowances are either delayed, shortened or not paid at all; when injured, little or no attention is given to them shifting the medical expenses on their families while families of those that died in action face difficulties in accessing the benefits of their love ones;

Weaknesses in regional cooperation continue to present significant challenge ranging from reintegrating ex-combatants to preventing farmer-herder conflicts and rebuilding rural economies. Given the fact that security challenge around Lake Chad region involved countries bordering the region, solutions to the problems required cross-border approaches. Evidently, coordination efforts remain largely loose resulting into slow response and insignificant success;

Ongoing insecurity in both northeast and north west has hindered the settlement of displaced communities and triggered new humanitarian crisis. Due to the military clearance of rural villages around Lake Chad continue to force more people to leave their homes and drive others into secondary displacement, pushing them into IDP camps. A large number of refugees that fled to villages in Cameroon were forced to return to Nigeria, thereby exacerbating the situation;

Lack of coordination and commitment has been the trend of the campaign against insurgency since its emergence in 2009. President Goodluck Jonathan led
government had pursued a highly militarized response neglecting other civilian stabilization strategies. Despite plethora of diversified response by Buhari led administration like unveiling Recovery and Peace-Building Assessment (RPBA) in the northeast in 2016; the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) etc coordination of various civilian institutions charged with coordinating the civilian response is still weak; 

Insurgency in the northeast in many times become rally point for political campaigns. Successive governments are accused of providing false information and figures on the progress in the campaign against the insurgents or conditions of the communities involved. On the other hand, the security agencies often give conflicting versions of their encounter with insurgents and number of casualties involved; 

Across all levels of governance, corruption and mismanagement directly undermine the conflict response. Humanitarian aid under Goodluck Jonathan administration was highly politicized. For instance, the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), an economic recovery project for the Northeast seemed existed mostly on paper. While elected on the promise of fighting corruption, commitment to addressing the security challenges by the present Buhari led administration is questioned. A 2016, investigation into PINE instituted by the Senate exposed large-scale corruption, including slush funds under the cover of payments to contractors, shelters, etc. including over $7.9 million unaccounted for (Kazeem, 2016). Between 2016 and 2018, de facto slush funds—dramatically increased under the guise of security votes (Kukah, 2018). This is in addition to the reports of government officials, traditional leaders, and local politicians diverting aid abound. Both NEMA and its state-level counterparts are subjected to the manipulation of politicians and their cronies and are accused of diverting millions of aid monies into private hands (Alqali, 2018).

Conclusion
The challenges of governance in the north, characterized by poor leadership seem to be a reflection of the larger Nigerian society. Although insurgency is identified as the most daunting security challenge facing the region, threats of farmers-herders conflict, armed robbery and communal clashes are threatening the peace, the region is known for decades. The general dissatisfaction with the various government including performance of electoral officials at all levels, lack of transparency and accountability, endemic corruption created opportunities that were exploited by insurgents to recruit poverty ravaged vulnerable persons to join their cause. Thus, explain the nexus between governance and security. The decades-long multi-layer security challenges created the prevalence of a perception that the government and her security agencies are inept in tackling the challenges.
Governance, peace and development are interconnected variables that influence each other. Unless managed effectively and resolved systematically, a negative change in one will invariably manifest in the others. The character and quality of governance and development must therefore be taken into cognizance in addressing peace and conflict. Similarly, peace, conflict and governance are important determinants of the quality of development, same way development and peace and conflict influence governance (Marshall & Cole, 2008, 2014).

**Recommendations**

As an impeccable means of ending violence, authorities are required to step up holistic measures and demonstrate commitments towards protecting lives of all groups and communities, as well as their assets and property. To achieve that, the government at federal and Northern states levels should pursue longer-term reconciliation, settlements, peacebuilding and disarmament that will ensure lasting peace and harmonious cohabitation. Specifically, the following is recommended:

i. Restoration of functional local government and basic service delivery such as rebuilding police stations, schools, health care centres, markets etc. Bringing back civil servants will help foster greater citizen trust in government, improve perceptions of state responsiveness and tackle the pervasive sense of marginalization in the region;

ii. Positive involvement of communities in decision making pertaining to local services and development priorities will enhance greater social cohesion and government accountability, a catalyst for delivering essential services. This is against the backdrop that unaccountable, top-down governance has been a key driver of conflict. To address this gap, there is need for the trainings and retraining of local and state government officials on the importance of community input, as well as participatory processes in which representatives of different groups—including women, youth, and traditional leaders—together decide on their ward-level reconstruction priorities;

iii. The need for concerted efforts to adopt targeted service provision as a means of countering recruitment by violent extremist groups particularly in remote areas. Programs targeted at providing ward or community-level interventions to address the needs of most at risk of recruitment (e.g. building boreholes, offering livelihood support and cash transfers, and restoring market places etc.) should be designed with the aim of offering a clear alternative to violent extremist groups;

iv. Proper scrutiny and reintegration of individuals affiliated with violent extremist groups back into communities, ensuring the peaceful mediation of local disputes as well as securing opportunities for youth who joined community defense militia like the CJTF during the conflict will help the affected individuals find their way back into civilian life,
thereby reducing the likelihood of a return to violence or criminality, and preventing the emergence of future conflicts. Proper scrutiny and reintegration of former Boko Haram members is a potential mechanism to weaken the capacity of violent extremist groups;

v. Government at all levels should improvise proactive mechanism of prevention human right abuse and corrupt practices while investigate major incidents of past abuses; misappropriation and diversion of fund meant for the execution of the war or reconstruction/rehabilitation programs. The need to expedite action concerning trials of individuals or organizations found to have participated, sponsored or been complicit in violence is an important deterrent;

vi. Establishment of vast grazing areas for herders to accommodate their cattle; and ranches with full range of services, infrastructure and markets required in accordance with its National Livestock Transformation Plan 2019 as a catalyst for boosting the country’s prosperity and promoting peaceful coexistence between farmers and herders;

vii. Establishing cattle monitoring and tracking devices/systems to help trace stolen cattle and rustlers. Preparatory to it, scrutiny mechanism to deal with rustling including cattle branding, certifying cattle traders, monitoring cattle markets and regulating slaughterhouses should be established;

viii. Community security forums comprising of farmers, pastoralists, vigilantes, ethnic and religious leaders, community leaders and state security should be facilitated and meet regularly to address any potential security threat;

ix. Federal and state authorities should secured areas of mining and ensure only state and licensed cooperatives are allowed. In addition, while gold mining in areas should be permitted, industry proceeds of mining should be protected from falling into the hands of illicit actors; and

x. The federal government should intensify efforts to mitigate the impact of climate change in the north. This is by among other strategies, offering rural communities with alternatives to cutting down trees to obtain firewood, adoption of efficient farming system that utilize available water resources, massive afforestation and other international adoptive measures.

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