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ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY IN CURBING INSURGENCY IN MAIDUGURI, BORNO STATE, NIGERIA.

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Introduction

Recent literature on counter insurgency suggests that the aftermath of the tragic event in the U.S.A. on September 11,2001 and the subsequent bomb attack in Berlin, Madrid ,and London, and the daily litany of attack on police, military personnel and civilians as the insurgency in Iraq, continues; informed the need for nations to design a counter-terrorism/insurgency strategy, if the threat to lives and national security is to be mitigated successfully Clussterbuck, (2006).

A close examination of history equally revealed that there are wide ranges of traditional methods of counter-insurgency that are now taken for granted as mainstays of

Abstract

In the late 1970s to the present date, there has been a persistent outbreak of ethno-religious violent ttacks across the country. Notable among is the recent Boko Haram insurgency of 2009 to date in Maiduguri and other North Eastern parts of Nigeria. All these crises in military parlance are regarded as internal security and low intensity conflicts (IS-LOC), which is the primary responsibility of the Nigerian Police Force and other para-military forces. As experiences have shown, however, these forces have had difficulties in curtailing and containing these civil disorders and disturbances in the past. Hence, the intervention of military is required to “assist civil power in times of civil disturbances, insecurity and conduct

Counter-insurgency operations as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. A lot of human and financial resources are geared toward bringing the insurgency to an end, but despite all these human and financial resources invested in curtailing the insecurity, the incident of insurgency is still prevailing, and at alarming rate, most especially going by the recent development such as abduction of several school girls, university lecturers and other related kidnappings and abductions for ransoms. The question that one will asked is: why is the military not succeeding in curtailing the insurgency? It is against this backdrop that this paper intends to analyses the issue and provide possible solution to the menace.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, Military

Counter-insurgency which had their origins in the nineteenth century perhaps more extra ordinarily, so do several of the new ideas that are currently being put forward as significant innovation. Not only were all of these identified from the 1880's onward as critical if the growing international problem of terrorism was to be dealt with both systems and structures were then put in place to achieve them Clusterbuck, (2006).

In Africa, the different security challenges have launched the continent into a series of devastating intra-state conflicts ever experienced in a single continent anywhere in the world in the last decade and a half. Eight of the fifteen "complex emergencies" declared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs were in Africa Herbst, (1981); Cilliers and Mills, (1999). Conflicts erupted into ethnic warfare in Central Africa, Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. There was armed uprising in Northern Uganda, civil war in Sudan and border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eriteria. Somalia has remained a collapsed state inspite of attempts to resuscitate it. In southern Africa, Lesotho witnessed an armed uprising. Angola was also in turmoil. In West Africa, Liberia was almost a collapsed state, even as rebels embattled Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. While Cote d'Ivoire experiences armed rebellion, Sudan is encountering humanitarian catastrophe arising from a bitter intra-state conflict, almost of a genocidal proportion. And in Nigeria, the military since 1966 have had to contend with breaches on the nation's security engendered by the upsurge in the formation and activities of armed militia groups within the country. The phenomenon of militia groups had its

historical antecedents in the January 1966 Isaac Boro's revolt against the Nigerian state. With one hundred and fifty –nine volunteers Boro proclaimed the Niger Delta People's Republic of Nigeria and launched a guerrilla war against the Federal Government. Boro also established the first ethnic militia in the Niger Delta known as Niger delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) that engaged the armed forces of Nigeria in a bloody battle. Although Isaac Adaka Boro was defeated by the federal troops, he awakened in the Ijaws the need for action against oppression and exploitation, Peterside,(2007).

The military is in Maiduguri the Borno State capital as a partner in trying to restore peace and order which has eluded the state by the unfortunate activities of the Boko haram sect since 2009. Available information indicates that the group emanated from an orthodox teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their school of thought considers anything western as an aberration or completely unislamic. The group viewed the western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion's weakness. Hence their declaration that western education and indeed all western institutions are infidel and as such must be avoided by Muslims. At first, both cleric and the larger community ignore the gospel as they dismissed the preacher as unknowledgeable, others saw them as sheer age propagandists who would not get the attention of the modern Muslims but events proved all wrong as the sect began to grow from strength to strength. In Bauchi, Yobe, and Borno State, many young people dropped out of school, including university students to join them, workers including highly placed administrators and tertiary institution lecturers also joined them. That was when the clerics began to fire at them with great vehemence knowing very well that it was no longer a tea party. But it was getting late then, as many youths have already separated from their families, while many people abandoned their jobs for the group. It was gathered that most people sold their belongings to contribute to the coffers of fighting the cause of Allah to save Islam from the clutches of western influences and domination Sani, (2011).

Some of the fundamental arguments or beliefs held by the group are that banking, taxation and jurisprudence in the country are completely infidel. Submitting to these void their belief. The entire faith of a true Muslim, they also argue is that western education was unislamic as it embodies all that Islam rejects, while it propagates the negative of what Allah and his prophet

had ordained. For instance, the mix of boys and girls under the same shade, the propagation of the theory that men evolved from the family of monkeys as well as the static nature of the sky. According to them, all these were in conflict with the direct words of Allah who said Muslims must not mix sexes under the same umbrella and that he created men from clay while the sun, earth and the moon each move on its own axis. They further argue that today's banking system is shylock and Islam forbids interest in financial transaction, just as the laws of the land are man-made, in replacement of the ones ordained by Allah, Sani, (2011).

It was in their bid to run away from all of these vices that members of the sect decided to cluster together in a strategic location in the outskirts of most major towns in Bauchi and Yobe.

As early as 2002, Yusuf was seen by many as a likely heir to the renown late Sheik Jafaar Mahmud Adam in Maiduguri because of his brilliance and closeness to the late renown scholar. But all that changed shortly after one Mohammed Alli (now late) approached late Yusuf with reasons to boycott democracy, civil service and western oriented schools. Late Yusuf then disengaged his service with the Yobe State government. In a 2006 press release signed by the sect's Shura (consultative) council, they stated that Islam permits them to subsist under a modern government like Nigeria but has explicitly prohibited them from joining or supporting such government as long as their systems, structures and institutions have elements contradictory to core Islamic principles and beliefs. However, the late Alli argued that the sect must embark on Hijra (migration), but late Yusuf decline and Alli proceeded to Kannamma in Yobe with his faction. One thing led to another, the group launched an insurgent attack on the police that resulted in the loss of many lives and properties in Kanamma and later in Gwuzi in Borno State.

Although the insurgent, a renegade group that called itself "Taliban" led by Alli, fiercely disagreed with late Yusuf and many of the escapees later returned to Yusuf. Unlike Alli, Yusuf went on undeterred, though he was prevented from preaching in several mosques and was denied TV/Radio appearances in the state, but he set up a preaching outlet in the front of his house at the Railway quarters and at Anguwar Doki, millionaires quarters among others. The demand for his tapes increased by the day all over the north and the proceeds there from increased tremendously. He then asked

his landlord and in law, late Baba Fugu Mohammed to allow him build a mosque which he named Ibn Taimiyya Masjid (Sani, 2011).

It was in Ibn Taimiyya Masjid that the late Yusuf together with his hard line top — Abubakar Shekau, alias “Darul tauhid” began to build an imaginary state within a state. Together they set up laginas (departments), they had a cabinet, the shura, the Hisbah, the brigades of guilds, a military wings, a large farm, an effective microfinance scheme, and late Yusuf played the role of a judge in settling disputes. Each state had an Amir (leader) including Amirs in Chad and Niger that gave account of their stewardship to Yusuf directly. The sect led by Yusuf, took advantage of the poor quality of our educational system, the incessant strikes, cult activities, widespread malpractices and prostitution that is made worse with no offer of job after graduation to lure many youths to abandon school and embrace Yusuf’s new and emerging state which promised to offer them a better education. Late Yusuf also took advantage of the irresponsible leadership at all levels of government, unemployment, poverty, corruption and insecurity. And as he pointed out such failures, citing verses of Quran and the saying of the prophet, the youths saw him as the leader who will indeed deliver them from malevolence to the Promised Land, Sani, (2011).

Membership

In the early stage of the group, he was able to attract membership from the families of the high and mighty in Borno State. In fact, at a point, one of the sons of the former SSG in one of the States of the North East region was a member of this group. His father was from Jakusko while his mother is from Barde. Many other members of prominent families from Borno and Yobe States reportedly joined or later became sympathetic to his cause and supported it financially.

His Threats

Sheikh Muhammed Yusuf style of preaching was reportedly insisting, yet he was not bothered. This brought him in some confrontations with the law enforcement agents. In truth, the authorities can hardly claim ignorance of the activities of Mohammed Yusuf and his men. As a matter of fact, he was arrested on several occasions by the police in Maiduguri but before the police

could roll out the drums and start celebrating his capture, Yusuf would have resurface in his vast compound in Maiduguri.

Time was when the man returned from Abuja barely five days after his arrest. In fact, people came all the way from Kaduna, Bauchi and Kano to welcome him. There was a long motorcade from the airport as thousands of his members trooped out to lead him to his house. After killing of Mohammed Yusuf the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January 2011. It resulted in the killing of four people (BBC News, 2012). Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity. (Sani, 2011)

It is in view of this that the military were deployed to the study area to restore law and order (Musa, 2012). However, the task of maintaining law and order by the military have reiterated that as fraught with a lot of issues and controversies, military authorities in reacting to issues have also been argued. (Omede, 2004). A particular perception of the phenomenon known as counter-insurgency has been in doubt (Clustterbuck, 2006). It is in light of this therefore the study assessed the activities of the military in relation to the boko haram insurgency in the study area.

Historical Background as to What Led to the Deployment of the Military in the Study Area

Before colonization and subsequent annexation into the British Empire, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active. It was a sovereign sultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. The Bornu Sultanate emerged after the overthrow of the Kanem-Bornu Empire ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for over 2000 years. The Bornu Sultanate is distinct from the Sokoto Caliphate established in 1802 by the military conquest of Usman Dan Fodio (Ogbonnaya, 2011) Both the Bornu Sultanate and Sokoto Caliphate came under control of the British in 1903. However, due to the activities of early Christian missionaries who used Western education as a tool for evangelism, it is viewed with suspicion by the local population. (Guy, 2012) Increased dissatisfaction gave rise to many among the Kanuri and other peoples of northeast Nigeria. One of the most famous such fundamentalist was Mohammed Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, who was at the height of his notoriety during the 1970s and 1980s. He was sent into exile by the

Nigerian authorities; he refused to believe Mohammed was the Prophet and instigated conflict in the country which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people. Some analysts view Boko Haram as an extension of the Maitatsine riots. (Bartollata, 2011) In 1995, the group was said to be operating under the same Shabaab, Muslim Youth Organisation with Mallam Lawal as the leader. When Lawal left to continue his education, Mohammed Yusuf took over leadership of the group. Yusuf's leadership allegedly opened the group to political influence and popularity. (BBC, 2009) Yusuf founded the group in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the aim of establishing a Shari'a government in Maiduguri Metropolis under then-Senator Ali Modu Sheriff. (Bartollata, 2011) He established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children, Guy, (2012) The centre had political goals and soon it was also working as a recruiting ground for future jihadists to fight the state, Guy, (2012) The group includes members who come from neighbouring Chad and Niger. (Washingtonpost, 2011) In 2004 the complex was relocated to Yusuf's home state of Yobe in the village Kanamma near the Niger border. (Aljazeera, 2013) Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss told IRIN News that Yusuf successfully attracted followers from unemployed youth "by speaking out against police and political corruption." Abdulkarim Mohammed, a researcher on Boko Haram, added that violent uprisings in Nigeria are ultimately due to "the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment. Wjadarai, (2011) Chris Kwaja, a Nigerian university lecturer and researcher, asserts that "religious dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes". Nigeria, he points out, has laws, giving regional political leaders the power to qualify people as 'indigenes' (original inhabitants) or not. It determines whether citizens can participate in politics, own land, obtain a job, or attend school. The system is abused widely to ensure political support and to exclude others. Muslims have been denied indigene-ship certificates disproportionately often. (BBC News, 2009) Nigeria's opposition leader Buba Galadima says: "What is really a group engaged in class warfare is being portrayed in government propaganda as terrorists in order to win counter-terrorism assistance from the West. (Aljazeera, 2009).

The group conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence, Ogbonnaya, (2011). That changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. (Huffington Post, 2011). Prior to that the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organisation, including that of a military officer (Huffington Post, 2011). When the military came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the death of an estimated 700 people. During the fighting with the security forces Boko Haram fighters reportedly "used fuel-laden motorcycles" and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station. (BBC News 2011) The group's founder and then leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed during this time while in police custody. (Reuters, 2012, Daily Trust, 2012). After Yusuf's killing, a new leader emerged whose identity was not known at the time, Cocks, (2012)

RE-EMERGENCE

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Strategies Used in Counter-Insurgency in Theory and Practice

The difficulties facing governments besieged by insurgents or terrorists may seem insurmountable at first glance, but numerous works have been written to explain how to quell them. This literature ranges from general theories and practical suggestions, based on hard-won experience, to complicated empirical models purporting to predict outcomes or test practical advice. Commentators have reduced complicated political-military struggles against forceful usurpers to a number of principles or formulas for success. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith suggested in his translation of Mao's Yu Chi Chan that 'anti-guerilla operations could be summed up in three words; location, isolation, and eradication' (Mao Tse-Tung, 1966). Griffith's summary is a useful reference point for exploring how to apply the strengths of a state (or group of states) against an irregular threat.

Location

The most important phase of any counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign is recognizing that the threat exists. Counter insurgency expert Thompson (1966) believed it necessary to tackle an insurgency during its subversion and organization phase or at the first signs of a sustained campaign of violence (Thompson, 1966, p. 50). In other words, he believed it necessary to defeat insurgents in both physical space and time. The problem for counterinsurgents and counterterrorist is to apply theory to distinguish between lawful or unlawful forms of discontent. Restricting guaranteed rights and freedoms every time a bomb is detonated will undermine the credibility and intentions of the government. Waiting too long to uphold the rule of law, however, will give the insurgents or terrorists the necessary time to build a robust organizational infrastructure that only the most dedicated efforts might hope to defeat.

Terrorism and insurgency can be staved off with enough early warning, but this implies that an effective intelligence-gathering and assessment organization is operating; few states possess such resources or foresight. Subversion, therefore, remains an attractive option for the discontented. Those willing and able to destroy the system need to be identified and tracked: this requires the assistance of a supportive populace. The question in pluralist systems is whether or not potentially seditious individuals can be taken under surveillance or arrested without violating civil liberties and undermining the rule of law.

Upholding the rule of law is crucial if states are to preserve the legitimacy of their cause and maintain the moral high ground over insurgents or terrorists (Clutterbuck, 1990, pp. 10-11; Wilkinson, 1986, p. 127). Methods to counter terrorism, for example, must be as unobtrusive as possible. Consider airport metal detectors. They can help prevent terrorism while remaining within the boundary of the rule of law. Most of us regard metal detectors as an inconvenience and a necessary evil to prevent the smuggling of weapons on board commercial aircraft. Newly developed scanners can show concealed items through clothes. But the public has expressed outrage at potential infringements upon personal privacy out of proportion to the perceived threat. Managing how and when (and in what measure) to begin counterinsurgency and antiterrorism efforts, such as imposing curfews and controlling media access while upholding the rule of law, is the primary

challenge to any government under siege. In most democratic societies, however, steps to counter terrorists rarely are preventative and almost always are taken after horrific acts of violence have been committed, as Washington's response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks demonstrates.

Once an irregular threat has been identified, various civil and military agencies must localize the threat while coordinating their response. They must identify safe houses, group members, and sources of supply. Gathering such information about the terrorists can be daunting, given the desire of most subversives to keep the organization small, stealthy, and secret. For a state providing direct counter insurgency or counter terrorism support into a geographically and culturally unfamiliar country, as the United States did in South Vietnam, obtaining even basic information on subversives takes time. The time gained is used by insurgents to retain the initiative and develop the organization further.

Isolation

Isolating insurgents and terrorists from their bases of support is probably the most important element of successful campaigns against them. Isolation can take the form of physical separation or political alienation. Physical separation can be achieved by moving villagers into more easily defended compounds, known in Malaya and Vietnam as 'strategic hamlets'. Preventative measures such as curfews, prohibited ('no-go') areas, food rationing, aggressive patrolling, and overt presence also can physically isolate insurgents. As with any form of deterrence, the threat posed by patrolling and presence must be a credible one and not consist simply of half-hearted 'cordon and search' operations. Isolation also means limiting the mobility and range of the insurgents or terrorists, in effect taking away their space and their time. Insurgents and terrorists also can be cut off from their external sources of support by a combination of diplomatic pressure and military measures. The French managed to block external support from reaching the Army Liberation Nationale during the Algerian insurgency (1954-62): the border between Algeria and its neighbours Morocco and Tunisia was shut down by a combination of wire barriers, guardhouses, and patrols, Griffith, (1961)

Segregating insurgents and terrorists from the population involves more than just physically separating them. To impose meaningful isolation, the state must defuse the irregular's most powerful asset: its political message. Widely held grievances that foster a potent source of recruitment and support must be mitigated by the government. Obviously, some messages are more influential than others: self-determination is difficult to counter by an external or occupying power, whereas demands for land reform or increased political representation can be more easily satisfied. The words of the government must be accompanied by effective deeds to show that the state can and will respond to what amounts to political extortion. The terrorist or insurgent 'propaganda of the deed' must be diffused by government displays of a firm, yet lawful response. The displays can range from enforcing a 'no negotiations with terrorists' policy to simple measures like improving crop yields or building schools and wells. The onus is on the representatives of the state to prove that they are morally superior to the guerrillas and terrorists and will provide for the needs of their citizens, including responding to the sources of disgruntlement that led to armed insurrection in the first place. Likewise, the terrorist or insurgent cause must be discredited. Leniency also should be extended to those insurgents and terrorists who give up the armed struggle. Above all, citizens must be convinced that the state's fight is their fight. Popular support for the terrorists or insurgents must be denied through credible and efficient actions to win what Sir Gerald Templar called 'the hearts and minds' of the population. With little internal or external sustenance flowing to the rebels and a population willing to support the government, it is only a matter of time before the state's forces destroy the irregular threat, Donnelly, (1967)

Eradication

Eradication involves the physical destruction of the insurgents or terrorists, although few would go so far as to follow Robert Taber's rhetorical advice; 'There is only one means of defeating an insurgent people who will not surrender, and that is extermination. There is only one way to control a territory that harbors resistance, and that is to turn it into a desert, Taber, (1972). The state has numerous advantages over its opponents given its control over social, fiscal, and military resources. The most important question in democratic states is whether or not the leaders of the state can

apply their resources effectively to extinguish the insurgent flame without alienating popular support for their own authority. Cultural context matters when determining a response. Canadians, for example, would not approve of measures like the so-called 'Wrath of God' retribution campaign conducted by the Israelis against those responsible for the massacre at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Counter-insurgency theory is rife with active plans that discuss destruction of guerrillas. These plans range from French Marshal Lyautey's innocuous-sounding 'oil patch' method applied in Morocco in the first quarter of the twentieth century (Gottman et al, 1948, p. 248) to the more sinister-sounding Nazi German 'spider's web' and 'partridge drive' tactics (Dixon and Heilbrunn, 1962, pp. 215-16). All theorists agree that eliminating the insurgents' safe havens must be a priority. Numbers also make a difference. The accepted ratio of government forces to guerrillas is often cited as 10:1. Most theorists also assert that specialized units (e.g. special forces) are needed to defeat the irregulars at their own game. Some advocate the use of technologies not available to the insurgents, such as helicopters and remote sensors, to enhance the force-to-space balance between government and irregular forces and to achieve superior mobility. There also are passive ways in which the state can subvert an insurgency and thereby diminish the number of guerrillas or terrorists. One such method combines psychological.

'Hearts and Minds'

The phrase 'the battle for hearts and minds' underscores the political dimension of irregular warfare. During the early stages of the Vietnam, or Second Indochina war (1965-75), the South Vietnamese guerrillas, or Viet Cong, tried to win the conflict by coercing peasants into joining or assisting the revolt. Coercion took forms as divergent as public executions and village propaganda sessions. The former would sow fear among those who were thinking of supporting the government whereas repetitive proselytizing played upon the audiences' aspirations, such as the desire for land reform or to find an escape from the tedium of village life. The response of one particular peasant illustrates the pervasiveness and influence of politics in irregular warfare:

In the beginning I was very hurt and angry with [the Viet Cong] for killing my father ... they told me that because my father had done wrong, he had to be punished,, They talked to the point where I felt that they were right... came to

hate my father even though I didn't know [exactly] what he had done. Donnelli (1967, p.97)

Warfare techniques, promises of amnesty (e.g. the Chieu Hoi, or 'Open Arms' programmed used in South Vietnam) and cash incentives (for weapons and information) to convince insurgents and terrorists that their struggle is in vain. Political and economic pressure can be placed on states or groups providing safe havens for terrorists and insurgents.

Passive and active techniques are not mutually exclusive and can be combined for a synergistic effect. During the bush war (1965-80) in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), for example, a sizeable number of guerrillas were persuaded not only to give up the armed struggle but also to operate against their former comrades. The 'pseudo guerrillas', as they were called, would dress as insurgents and patrol villages, gathering information on the whereabouts of active guerrilla units. Occasionally, 'pseudo guerrilla' groups would ambush guerrilla units, fomenting mistrust and, occasionally, provoking pitched battles among 'friendly forces' (Reid-Daly, 1999), Other passive measures include engaging in political dialogue with, and offering support for, moderates within an irregular organization, convincing them of the need to start talking and stop fighting.

Political will must underlie efforts to counter terrorism and insurgency. The eradication of an irregular movement is a gradual process of attrition that requires a significant and consistent investment in time and resources. Rarely have national leaders been able to sustain the political will necessary to defeat insurgents or terrorists. Equally daunting is the fact that the underlying causes of discontent often resurface and the embers of insurgency are rekindled in a different form. For example, the government of the Philippines conducted a textbook campaign to defeat a communist insurgency during the 1950s with US assistance and inspired leadership. Yet barely a decade later, had the Philippine government faced a new challenge from Muslim separatist and hardcore Marxist guerrillas. Today Philippine leaders continue to struggle against groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, which sustains itself through a lucrative trade in ransoming hostages. Some commentators have suggested that terrorism and irregular warfare are analogous to the mythical hydra: cut off one head and several more appear in its place, Reid-Daly, (1999)

The effects of insurgency can be limited through a combination of offensive and defensive measures, but ultimately bringing terrorists to justice,

especially for crimes beyond state borders, can be accomplished by a combination of determination to bring those guilty to justice, the political will to sustain the struggle and not compromise core societal values, and maximized use of the full range of response capabilities. The Bush Administration signaled out its determination, and that of the American people, for the lengthy struggle against terrorism in the wake of the September 2001 attacks. In conjunction with this stated policy, various officials within the Administration emphasized that military action is only one tool in the toolbox of possible US responses. Direct military action has a certain utility but it will not stop terrorism alone; US efforts, and those of its allies, have focused all measures to root out terrorism, including the eradication of training facilities, financial assets, political sponsorship, and even the individuals themselves who belong to or support al-Qaeda. Bringing individuals to trial for actions below the threshold of 'an act of war' takes even greater reserves of time, patience, resolve, negotiation, and treasure. It took the United States 12 years and considerable third-party support, for example, to bring those allegedly responsible for the Lockerbie bombing to trial. (Reidal Daly, 1999)

Research Methodology

Qualitative research approach which is descriptive based was used in the analyses. Secondary data was utilised using relevant books, journals, and other relevant publications for the data collection and analyses.

Conclusions

The study found out that the counter-insurgency strategies used by the military has not yielded the expected result because it has only reduced but not ended the activities of the insurgents which is currently going on and at alarming rate. Also, the counter-terrorist strategies adopted by the military have an adverse effect and infringe on the rights of the innocent population in the study area, and as such majority of the respondents said they were not satisfied with the operations of the military.

Furthermore, the study made conclusion on the level of cooperation, the community has given to the military in the study area and it was found out to be high, also the relationship between the military and the general public was cordial and the emergence of the civilian Joint Task Force was part of the community response to curb terrorist activities in the study area, by and large

they are overseen by the military commander in the state, i.e. the CJTF, and most of the respondents suggested that the CJTF should be fully co-opted into the military operations in curbing terrorist activities in the study area.

Finally, the study concluded that majority of the common respondents (civilians) were not sure of whether there is a clear and comprehensive counter-terrorist measures taken by the military to curb terrorism, only few members of the military provided answers in the affirmative. Nevertheless, the study revealed that the military are not well equipped and motivated and that the negative views of the community on military activities have hindered the military from curbing terrorist activities in the study area. It was also found that interest and lack of trust between the military have contributed to the problems of curbing insurgency within the study area.

Recommendations

The following recommendations below were based on the findings of the study:-

1. Government should as a matter of policy, initiate a law that forbids all forms of political violence and thuggery, and through various intelligence and economic measures delink any sect or group from metamorphosing into terrorism.
2. Community policing and volunteer forces should be encouraged by the government so as to access information from the locals regarding the activities of the insurgents/ terrorists.

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